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Which Law Is Supreme? The Interplay
Between the New York Convention and
The McCarran-Ferguson Act
BRIAN A. BRIZ* & CÉSAR MEJÍA-DUEÑAS*
The McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted in 1945 to
safeguard the rights of the states to regulate the business of
insurance. It provides that acts of Congress not specifically
related to the business of insurance are superseded by state
laws that regulate the business of insurance. In 1970, the
United States ratified the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York
Convention). Congress enacted Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act to implement the New York Convention. The
New York Convention requires courts to recognize and enforce both private agreements to arbitrate and arbitration
awards made in other contracting states. Because the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, on the one hand, provides that
general federal laws not related to the business of insurance
are superseded by state insurance laws, and the New York
Convention, on the other hand, obligates courts to recognize
and enforce private arbitration agreements and arbitral
awards, courts have struggled with whether the New York
Convention preempts state insurance laws that prohibit arbitration of insurance disputes. Indeed, several states have
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enacted legislation prohibiting clauses in insurance contracts divesting the state courts of jurisdiction, while many
others have excluded insurance contracts from their corresponding arbitration codes. We address this conflict between the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the New York Convention and, specifically, analyze how courts within the
Eleventh Circuit have decided the issue.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Regulation of the Business of Insurance – Enactment of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act
Traditionally, “the States enjoyed a virtually exclusive domain
over the insurance industry.”1 Indeed, in 1869, the U.S. Supreme
Court held in Paul v. Virginia that “[i]ssuing a policy of insurance
is not a transaction of commerce,” and hence not subject to federal
regulation.2 In 1944, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an
insurance company that conducted business across state lines was
engaged in interstate commerce, and therefore, subject to federal
laws (in that case, antitrust laws).3
In order to assuage fears that the federal government would intrude on the states’ power to tax and regulate the insurance industry,
“Congress moved quickly to restore the supremacy of the States in
the realm of insurance regulation.”4 Consequently, in 1945, Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act,5 (“MFA”), wherein,
among other things, it declared that the “continued regulation and
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the
public interest . . . .”6 Thus, the MFA reinforced that the states have
near-exclusive authority to regulate the business of insurance.
The MFA contains two primary provisions relevant to this chapter. First, section 1012(a) vests in the states the authority to regulate
the business of insurance by providing that “[t]he business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws
of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business.”7 Second, section 1012(b) contains a reverse-preemption
provision that provides: “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . .”8 In other
1

St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 539 (1978).
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (1 Wall.) 168, 183 (1869).
3
United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 546–51 (1944)
(holding that the Sherman Antitrust Act applied to the business of insurance, and
therefore, insurance could be regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause).
4
U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 499–500 (1993).
5
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (1946).
6
Id. § 1011.
7
Id. § 1012(a).
8
Id. §§ 1012(a)–(b).
2
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words, acts of Congress that do not specifically relate to the business
of insurance are reverse-preempted by state insurance laws and regulations.9
B. State Laws Restricting Arbitration of Insurance Claims
Approximately one-third of the states have enacted legislation
prohibiting or restricting arbitration of disputes against insurers.
Six states have enacted laws prohibiting clauses in insurance
contracts that deprive the respective state courts of jurisdiction over
disputes against insurers, or in the case of Maine, 10 against foreign
insurers. These states include Hawaii,11 Louisiana,12 Massachusetts,13 Virginia,14 and Washington.15
Additionally, ten states have excluded certain types of disputes
arising from insurance contracts from their respective arbitration
codes. These states include Arkansas,16 Georgia,17 Kentucky,18 Missouri,19 Montana,20 Nebraska,21 Oklahoma,22 South Carolina,23
South Dakota,24 and Vermont.25 The District of Columbia has also
enacted legislation declaring arbitration clauses in consumer insurance contracts void and unenforceable.26
Finally, California has enacted a law that restricts the arbitration
of disputes with healthcare insurers by requiring certain formalities
in the arbitration agreements in order for them to be enforceable.27
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Id. § 1012(b).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2433 (2019).
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:10-221 (WEST 2019).
LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:868 (2019).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 22 (2019).
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-312 (2019).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.18.200 (West 2020).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-230 (West 2019).
GA. CODE ANN § 9-9-2 (West 2020).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.050 (West 2020).
MO. ANN. STAT. § 435.350 (West 2019).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114 (West 2019).
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-2602.01 (West 2019).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1855 (West 2019).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10 (2019).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25A-3 (2019).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5653 (West 2019).
D.C. CODE § 16-4403(c)(1), (d) (2020).
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1363.1 (West 2020).
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C. The New York Convention and the Chapter 2 of the Federal
Arbitration Act
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (“Convention”) was established in 1958 to provide
standard procedures for the recognition and enforcement of private
arbitration agreements entered into in fellow contracting states, and
to recognize and enforce arbitral awards issued in such states.28 Specifically, the Convention requires signatories to (1) recognize and
enforce written agreements to submit disputes to non-domestic arbitration, and (2) enforce non-domestic arbitral awards entered in
contracting states29 absent any of the enumerated grounds for refusal.30
As indicated in the U.S. Senate Report concerning the implementation of the Convention, the United States did not sign the Convention when it was originally adopted due to concern that certain
provisions contained therein conflicted with domestic laws.31 Subsequently, Congress amended the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)
and included Chapter 2 to incorporate and implement the Convention.32
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Federal Circuit Courts have split on whether the MFA preempts
the Convention and Chapter 2 of the FAA, and if it does, to what
extent. Specifically, the courts have split on whether, under the
MFA, state laws that restrict or prohibit the arbitration of insurance
disputes are preempted by the Convention.

28

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards arts I–III, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention].
29
Id.
30
Albert Jan van den Berg, Why Are Some Awards Not Enforceable?, in
INT’L COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION CONG., SER. NO. 12, NEW
HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND BEYOND 291,
291–92 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2005).
31
H.R. REP. NO. 91-1181 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3601,
3601–02.
32
Id. at 3602.
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In U.S. Department of Treasury v. Fabe, the U.S. Supreme Court
established a three-prong test to determine whether federal laws unrelated to the business of insurance are reverse-preempted by state
insurance laws and regulations under the MFA. 33 Under the test,
courts must consider whether (1) the state statute was enacted for
the purpose of regulating the business of insurance; (2) the federal
statute involved “does not specifically relat[e] to the business of insurance”; and (3) the application of the federal statute would “invalidate, impair, or supersede” the state statute regulating insurance.34
While the Fabe test provides guidance for resolving conflicts
between federal laws and state insurance laws, it provides little guidance as to whether the Convention, an international treaty, supersedes the MFA.35 Complicating the issue is the fact that courts have
not agreed on if the Convention is self-executing. Several courts
have declined to determine whether the convention is self-executing
but have nonetheless held the Convention supersedes the MFA.36
Other courts have found it is not self-executing because the Convention was enacted through Chapter 2 of the FAA, and it is therefore
an act of Congress that interferes with state laws regulating the business of insurance, and consequently, is reverse-preempted under the
MFA.37
A. Cases Holding the Convention is Superseded by the MFA
The Second and Eighth Circuits have found that, under the
MFA, state-level anti-arbitration provisions supersede the Convention and Chapter 2 of the FAA. These Circuits have concluded that

33

U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 500–01 (1993).
Id. In Union Labor Life Insurance v. Pireno, the U.S. Supreme Court identified three criteria that are relevant to determining what constitutes the “business
of insurance”: “first, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder’s risk; second, whether the practice is an integral part of the
policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and third, whether the
practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry.” 458 U.S. 119, 129
(1982) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
35
See Fabe, 508 U.S. at 500–01.
36
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587
F.3d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 2009); ESAB Grp. v. Zurich Ins., 685 F.3d 376, 380 (4th
Cir. 2012).
37
Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins., 66 F.3d 41, 45–46 (2d Cir. 1995).
34
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the Convention—because it was enacted by implementing legislation through Chapter 2 of the FAA—is not a self-executing treaty,
and therefore, does not preempt conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.38
The Second Circuit first addressed the issue in Stephens v. American International Insurance Co.39 Stephens concerned a dispute between an insolvent insurance company chartered under the laws of
Kentucky and a foreign reinsurer arising from a reinsurance contract
containing a broad arbitration clause.40 The first issue the court had
to decide was whether the FAA preempts the Kentucky Liquidation
Act, a state law which contains an “anti-arbitration provision” and
regulates the performance of insurance contracts once an insurer is
insolvent.41 Because the Kentucky Liquidation Act was a law enacted “for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,” the
court held the law was preserved and not preempted by the FAA,
which does not specifically relate to the business of insurance. 42 Beyond this, the court also held that the Convention did not preempt
the Kentucky Liquidation Act under the Supremacy Clause because
it is not self-executing and “relies upon an Act of Congress for its
implementation.”43 Specifically, the court held that the Convention’s “implementing legislation”—Chapter 2 of the FAA—does
not preempt the Kentucky Liquidation Act, and, therefore, is “inapplicable” to the dispute in question.44 Thus, even though the Convention mandates the recognition and enforcement of private agreements to arbitrate amongst parties in contracting states, the Convention was reverse-preempted by the “anti-arbitration” provision in the
Kentucky Liquidation Act.45

38

Id. at 45.
Id.
40
Id. at 42–43.
41
Id. at 43–45.
42
Id. at 44–45.
43
Id. at 45.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 45–46. In a subsequent decision, however, the Second Circuit held
that the MFA did not supersede the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”)
because Congress intended for the FSIA to preempt all contrary state law. Stephens v. Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 69 F.3d 1226, 1232 (2d Cir. 1995). Recognizing the potential conflict with its earlier decision, the court noted that the
39
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The Eight Circuit arrived at the same conclusion in Transit Casualty Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London.46 Like Stephens, Transit involved a dispute between an insolvent insurance
company (this time, a Missouri company) and a foreign reinsurer
wherein the subject reinsurance agreement contained an arbitration
clause.47 Also like in Stephens, the Transit court found that Missouri’s arbitration statute—which expressly exempts insurance contracts from the categories of agreements that may contain enforceable agreements to arbitrate—is not preempted by the FAA or the
Convention because unlike the latter laws, the former law was enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.48
While the Transit court did not expressly address whether the Convention is self-executing, it explained that the Convention was implemented by Congress through the amendment of the FAA, and
specifically, through the inclusion of Chapter 2 of the FAA.49
B. Cases Holding the MFA Does Not Supersede the
Convention
In contrast with the Second and Eighth Circuits, the Fifth and
Fourth Circuits have rejected the argument that, under the MFA,
state arbitration laws related to the business of insurance reversepreempt the Convention.50 For different reasons, they have each
held that state-level insurance disputes are not exempt from the Convention pursuant to the MFA’s reverse-preemption provision.51
Sitting en banc, the Fifth Circuit addressed the interaction between the MFA and the Convention in Safety National Casualty
Corp. v. Certain Underwriters At Lloyd’s, London.52 There, the

same reasoning might apply to Chapter 2 of the FAA, but the court declined to
consider the conflict at that time. Id. at 1233 n.6.
46
Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 119 F.3d
619, 621–22 (8th Cir. 1997).
47
Id. at 620.
48
Id. at 621, 623–24.
49
Id. at 620.
50
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587
F.3d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 2009); ESAB Grp. v. Zurich Ins., 685 F.3d 376, 380 (4th
Cir. 2012).
51
Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 724; ESAB Grp., 685 F.3d at 388, 390.
52
Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 717.

1132

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1124

court found it was “unclear” whether the Convention is self-executing because the requirements of the Convention are largely compulsory, but the Supreme Court had suggested in dicta that at least portions of the Convention are not self-executing.53 Notwithstanding,
the court went on to hold that even if the Convention was not selfexecuting, the Convention nonetheless supersedes the MFA for two
primary reasons.54
First, the MFA only reverse preempts acts of Congress or statutes, not treaties.55 A treaty, the court held, “remains an international
agreement or contract negotiated by the Executive Branch and ratified by the Senate, not by Congress[,]” and even if it is implemented
by Congress, it “does not mean that it ceases to be a treaty and becomes an ‘Act of Congress.’”56
Second, even though the Convention was implemented through
Chapter 2 of the FAA, it is the Convention and not Chapter 2 of the
FAA that supersedes state law.57 Indeed, as explained by the court,
Chapter 2 provides, at 9 U.S.C. § 203, that “[a]n action or proceeding falling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise under the
laws and treaties of the United States.”58 This, the court explained,
is “a direct indication that Congress thought that for jurisdictional
purposes, an action falling under the Convention arose not only under the laws of the United States but also under treaties of the United
States.”59 Chapter 2 of the FAA, the court further explained, defines
when an arbitration agreement “falls under the Convention” and
provides United States courts with jurisdiction over “[a]n action or
proceeding falling under the Convention . . . .”60 Accordingly, because Chapter 2 of the FAA “directs us to the treaty it implemented,”

53

Id. at 721–22 (citing Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 521–22 (2008)).
Id. at 722–24.
55
Id. at 722 (“Even if the Convention required legislation to implement some
or all of its provisions in United States courts, that does not mean that Congress
intended an ‘Act of Congress,’ as that phrase is used in the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, to encompass a non-self-executing treaty that has been implemented by congressional legislation.”).
56
Id. at 723 (citations omitted).
57
Id. at 724–25.
58
Id. at 724 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 203 (2018)).
59
Id.
60
Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 202).
54
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it is the treaty itself that we construe, and not the implementing legislation, when determining whether the Convention supersedes state
law.61 In other words, because “the Convention, an implemented
treaty, rather than the Convention Act, supersedes state law, the
[MFA’s] provision that ‘no Act of Congress’ shall be construed to
supersede state law regulating the business of insurance is inapplicable.”62
Less than three years after the Safety National decision, the
Fourth Circuit also grappled with the issue as to whether the Convention supersedes the MFA in ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Insurance PLC.63 In ESAB, the defendants—foreign insurers—sought to
remove an action filed by a domestic insured, arguing that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction because the operative insurance policies contained arbitration clauses governed under the
Convention.64 Like the Safety National court, the ESAB court did
not resolve the question whether the Convention is self-executing,
listing reasons why it could be considered both self- and non-selfexecuting, and stating “the question of what constitutes a self-executing treaty has long confused courts and commentators.”65
Instead, the court held that the Convention supersedes the MFA
because the MFA “is limited to legislation within the domestic
realm.”66 Specifically, the court explained that the MFA did not “apply to every federal statute” and that Congress did not intend for the
MFA “to apply so broadly.”67 The court further explained that Congress did not intend for the MFA “to permit state law to vitiate international agreements entered by the United States.”68 Finally, the
court identified a number of occasions where other Courts of Appeals refused to afford the MFA an overly-broad scope and reasoned
that, because Chapter 2 of the FAA “provides, without exception,
that the Convention ‘shall be enforced in United States courts,’”
61

Id. at 725.
Id.
63
685 F.3d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 2012).
64
Id. at 380.
65
Id. at 387 (citation omitted).
66
Id. at 388.
67
Id.; See Am. Ins. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 428 (2003) (“[The MFA
was] directed to implied preemption by domestic commercial legislation.”).
68
ESAB Grp. v. Zurich Ins., 685 F.3d 376, 389 (4th Cir. 2012) (citations
omitted).
62
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Congress intended to replace all contrary state laws. 69 The court
contrasted this language with that of the MFA, which contains “no
such express direction[,]” and whose aim “is not arbitration or treaties, but ‘domestic commerce legislation.’”70 Because of this, the
court held that Chapter 2 of the FAA, “as legislation implementing
a treaty, is not subject to reverse preemption, so insurance disputes
are not exempt from [Chapter 2] pursuant to [MFA’s] reversepreemption rule.”71 Additionally, the court held that—even if Chapter 2 and the MFA are in irreconcilable conflict—the more recent
Chapter 2 of the FAA would prevail over the MFA. 72
III. CURRENT SITUATION IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
The Eleventh Circuit has been silent on the interaction between the MFA and the Convention. This is probably because, as
explained below, of the three states within the Eleventh Circuit (Alabama, Florida and Georgia), Georgia is the only one containing an
anti-arbitration provision related to the business of insurance.73
A. Alabama Arbitration Law
Alabama has not enacted any laws that prohibit or restrict the
use of arbitration clauses in insurance contracts. Alabama, however,
does have a general law prohibiting arbitration. Specifically, section
8-1-41 of the Alabama Code provides that “[a]n agreement to submit
a controversy to arbitration” “cannot be specifically enforced.” 74
Notwithstanding, the Alabama Supreme Court has held that the statute does not relate to the business of insurance and, therefore, does
not benefit from the MFA’s reverse-preemption provision.75

69

Id. at 389–90 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2018)).
Id. at 390 (citing Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 428).
71
Id.
72
Id. at n.6 (citing Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003)).
73
See discussion infra Section III.C; GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2(c)(3) (West).
74
ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (2003), invalidated by Cent. Reserve Life Ins. v.
Fox, 869 So. 2d 1124 (Ala. 2003).
75
Cent. Reserve Life Ins. v. Fox, 869 So. 2d 1124, 1127 (Ala. 2003); see Am.
Bankers Ins. of Fla. v. Crawford, 757 So. 2d 1125, 1136 (Ala. 1999).
70
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B. Florida Arbitration Law
Like Alabama, Florida has not enacted any laws that prohibit or
restrict the use of arbitration clauses in insurance contracts. Unlike
Alabama, Florida is a relatively pro-arbitration state, containing
both a domestic and international arbitration code. Specifically,
Florida has enacted both the Revised Florida Arbitration Code76 and
the Florida International Commercial Arbitration Act.77 The former
governs any agreement to arbitrate made on or after July 1, 2013 or
arbitration proceedings initiated on or after July 1, 2016.78 The latter
applies to international commercial arbitration, subject to any agreement in force between the United States and any other country or
countries.79
C. Georgia Arbitration Law
Unlike Alabama and Florida, Georgia has enacted legislation expressly addressing the use of arbitration clauses in insurance contracts. Specifically, the Georgia Arbitration Code excludes “[a]ny
contract of insurance” from the scope of the act.80 While the Georgia
Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have both held that Georgia’s anti-arbitration provision reverse-preempts the FAA, the
courts assessed this conflict in cases involving domestic disputes.81
In contrast, the analysis yields a different result when confronting
the MFA and the FAA in the purview of international disputes. In
Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co. I, Inc., the
court held Georgia’s anti-arbitration provision does not conflict with
the Convention because the MFA only applies to arbitration agreements within the United States.82 The court arrived at its decision by
citing other district court decisions that held that the MFA “applies

76

Revised Florida Arbitration Code, FLA. STAT. §§ 682.01–.25 (2019).
Florida International Commercial Arbitration Act, FLA. STAT.
§§ 684.0001–.0049 (2019).
78
FLA. STAT. § 682.013. The Revised Florida Arbitration Code replaced the
Florida Arbitration Code, which had been in effect since 1957.
79
FLA. STAT. § 684.0002(1).
80
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2(c)(3) (2019).
81
McKnight v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 358 F.3d 854, 855 (11th Cir. 2004);
Love v. Money Tree, Inc., 614 S.E.2d 47, 48 (Ga. 2005).
82
466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1302–03 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
77
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only to domestic agreements, and thus the Convention . . . controls.”83 Because of this, and following “the Eleventh Circuit’s mandate that ‘[t]he Convention must be enforced according to its terms
over all prior inconsistent rules of law,’” the court held that the
MFA—a prior federal law—could not be used as a defense to the
Convention.84 In light of this mandate from the Eleventh Circuit, the
court found that the Stephens85 decision out of the Second Circuit—
which did not address the issue of the MFA being passed before
Chapter 2 of the FAA—was “unpersuasive.”86
Similarly, in Lloyds Underwriters v. Netterstrom, the court
adopted the position of the District Court of the Northern District of
Georgia in Goshawk Dedicated v. Portsmouth,87 holding the McCarran-Ferguson Act applies only to arbitration agreements within the
United States and that it has no effect on an international arbitration
agreement that is governed by the Convention.88 The court determined in the case of conflict between the FAA and the MFA, “[t]he
[FAA] must give way to contrary provisions of state laws regulating
the business of insurance” under the MFA.89 However, in the case
of conflict between state laws regulating insurance and international
arbitration, which is the subject matter of the Convention, the latter
will prevail over states laws by reason of the Convention being an

83
Id. at 1302–03 (citing In re Arbitration Between England Ship Owners
Mut. Ins. Ass’n (Luxembourg) & Am. Marine Corp., No. 91-3645, 1992 WL
37700, at *4–5 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 1992); Triton Lines, Inc. v. Steamship Mut.
Underwriting Ass’n. Ltd., 707 F. Supp. 277, 278–79 (S.D. Tex. 1989)).
84
Id. at 1304–05 (citing Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte
GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998)). In arriving at this conclusion, the
court also relied on the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396
F.3d 1289, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005), holding that “domestic defenses to arbitration
may only be recognized under the Convention ‘if there exists a precise, universal
definition . . . that may be applied effectively across the range of countries that
are parties to the Convention . . . .’” Goshawk Dedicated v. Portsmouth Settlement Co. I, 466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (citations omitted).
85
Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins., 66 F.3d 41, 42 (2d Cir. 1995).
86
Goshawk, 466 F. Supp. at 1305 n.9.
87
Id. at 1293.
88
Lloyds Underwriters v. Netterstrom, 17 So. 3d 732, 737–38 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2009).
89
Id. at 737.
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international agreement between the United States and other nations.90
Furthermore, in Lloyds Underwriters91 and in Goshawk,92 the
courts buttressed their decisions on the holding from Bautista v. Star
Cruises,93 holding that the non-domestic international arbitration
agreements were enforceable. In Bautista, the court restated the
long-standing principle that the FAA ‘“generally establishes a
strong presumption in favor of arbitration of international commercial disputes,’” and that an international arbitration agreement is enforceable under the Convention if (1) it is in writing; (2) it provides
for arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the Convention; (3)
the agreement arises out of a commercial legal relationship; and (4)
a party to the agreement is not an American citizen.94
Therefore, under the state of affairs in the Eleventh Circuit, state
laws regulating the business of insurance will not prevent the FAA
in the context of international arbitration.
IV. ADDRESSING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CONVENTION AND
THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT
The issue of preemption between the MFA and the Convention
is complex. To resolve it, courts might rely on constitutional provisions, precedent, statutory interpretation, and principles of international law. This Article explains how, through the correct application of these tools, the Convention supersedes conflicting provisions
under the MFA.
A. Supremacy Clause
The Convention, as an international treaty, is supreme law of the
land under the Constitution; therefore, conflicting state law provisions are preempted by the Supremacy Clause, which establishes
federal law’s supremacy over state law.95 This clause, which usually
90
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requires a straightforward analysis, becomes complex when the
courts are confronted with the reverse preemption provision from
the MFA or the application of the distinction between treaties that
are “self-executing” and those that are not. This distinction is relevant because some courts have concluded that non-self-executing
treaties are not binding on the United States until they have been
fully implemented.96 Accordingly, a treaty that is not self-executing
is not afforded supremacy under the Constitution.97
The Supreme Court first introduced the distinction between selfexecuting and non-self-executing treaties in Foster v. Neilson.98 In
Foster, the Court examined the Spain-United States treaty for its domestic effects and held that, when a treaty does not contain self-executing language but merely states a pledge to enact further legislation, the treaty does not take effect or become the supreme law of
the land unless Congress performs the legislative act.99 The Convention expressly states that a contracting state’s courts “shall, at the
request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration . . . .”100
This provision is not addressed to the executive or legislative
branch, instead, it commands the judiciary to refer to arbitration
those matters in which the parties made a valid arbitration agreement
within the meaning of the Convention.101
The precise nature of this distinction, and its very existence, is a
matter of controversy.102 “Congress will often bypass any chance of
doubt concerning the force of a treaty by enacting implementing legislation.”103 Out of an abundance of caution, Congress amended the
FAA to implement the Convention by requiring courts to enforce
96
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arbitration agreements,104 provided that the two instruments would
enter into force at the same time.
Furthermore, the Convention was ratified by the Senate and
signed by the U.S. President, satisfying the requirements under the
Constitution to enjoy supremacy over state laws.105 Accordingly,
state laws should not preempt the Convention as it relates to recognition and enforcement of international arbitration agreements.
Courts are required to interpret the FAA consistently with the Convention to achieve its objective and fulfill its purpose.
Congress cannot implicitly remove the supremacy given to international treaties by the Constitution and empower state anti-arbitration provisions because the supremacy clause mandates that states
laws conflicting with the international treaties are invalid.106 Additionally, treaty-making is not one of Congress’ enumerated powers,
but a function shared with the executive.107 Allowing state legislation to preempt treaties creates inconsistencies irreconcilable with
the national character required for international treaties. In Federalist Papers Number 75, Alexander Hamilton explained that the
“treaty making” function was placed in the Senate to achieve “a
steady and systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national character . . . .”108 Uniformity and national character are not achieved when Congress allows the states to
enact provisions inconsistent with international obligations. Consequently, Congress cannot grant preemption to state regulations that
directly conflict with international treaty obligations.
B. Last-In-Time Rule
Under the last-in-time rule, the Convention controls over conflicting provisions from the McCarran Ferguson Act. In 1870, the
Supreme Court first held that a federal law may supersede a treaty
and vice-versa.109 In Breard v. Greene, the Court affirmed that “an
104
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Act of Congress . . . is on a full parity with a treaty, and that when a
statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the
statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty null.”110 By the
same token, if a treaty and a federal statute conflict, “the one last in
date will control the other.”111
Thus, whether or not a treaty is self-executing, when a federal
statute and an international treaty conflict, courts are required to apply the last-in-time rule. This general principle allows Congress to
modify or repeal treaties by enacting subsequent legislation, even if
those enactments amount to violations of treaties under international
law.112
The MFA is incompatible with the Convention because it grants
federal law status to state laws regulating the business of insurance.113 In contrast, the Convention mandates that arbitration agreements must be enforced unless they fall within the enumerated
grounds under the convention. Because the business of insurance is
not contemplated as a defense to enforcement under the Convention,
the application of both provisions is impossible.
Chapter 2 of the FAA was enacted on July 31, 1970, providing
that it will be effective upon entry into force of the Convention.114
The Convention was entered into force for the United States on December 29, 1970.115 The MFA was enacted on March 9, 1945.116
Accordingly, under the last-in-time rule, the Convention should control in cases where it conflicts with the MFA.
C. Policy Favoring Arbitration
“While Congress acted to preserve the states’ dominance in insurance regulation, it moved” in the opposite direction to federalize
the policies regarding arbitration.117 The development of modern
American arbitration policy tracks a global movement toward the
acceptance of international arbitration. Following this trend, the
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
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523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957)).
Id. (quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)).
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 597, 599 (1884).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2018).
Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 91–368, §2, 84 Stat. 693 (1970).
Id. § 4.
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (1946).
ESAB Grp. v. Zurich Ins. PLC, 685 F.3d 376, 380 (4th Cir. 2012).
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United States enacted Chapter 1 of the FAA to liberalize the enforcement of arbitration in maritime and commercial contracts.118 Furthermore, the policy favoring international arbitration was widely
expanded by the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc.119 In Mitsubishi Motors, a dispute arose
between a car dealer and a joint venture car manufacturer.120 The
parties’ contract contained an arbitration agreement, which provided
that ‘“[a]ll disputes, controversies or differences which may arise
between [the parties] out of or in relation to [the contract] or for the
breach thereof, shall be finally settled by arbitration in Japan in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Japan Commercial
Arbitration Association.’”121 The dealer asserted an antitrust counterclaim against the Joint Venture.122 The Court held that in the light
of the clear intention of Congress, it was its obligation to shake off
the old judicial hostility towards arbitration, as well as the “unwillingness to cede jurisdiction of a claim arising under domestic law to
a foreign or transnational tribunal.”123
Some courts have concluded that the MFA should yield to the
strong policy favoring arbitration because “there is some indication
in the legislative history of the MFA that it was [limited] to [Interstate] Commerce Clause Legislation” and not foreign commerce.124
This is a valid conclusion considering that Congress enacted the
MFA under its power to regulate interstate commerce. Therefore,
states’ anti-arbitration provisions should yield to the Convention because there exists strong policy considerations in favor of arbitration.
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D. Statutory Interpretation
In its 1804 decision, Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, the
Supreme Court stated that “an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .”125 Since then, the Charming Betsy canon of construction has become an important component of the legal regime
defining the U.S. relationship with international law. It is applied
regularly by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts, and it is
enshrined in the black-letter-law provisions of the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.126
Enactment of Chapter 2 of the FAA was an act of Congress
aligning domestic legislation to comply with international obligations under both the Charming Betsy canon and the last-in-time rule;
had Congress wanted to provide a particular meaning, it could have
done so. Similarly, were Congress to have wanted state insurance
laws to preempt the Convention, it could have enacted legislation to
repeal the Convention. In the meantime, courts are required to interpret the MFA in a manner that does not violate the international obligations imposed by the Convention.
E. Principle of Good Faith
The Convention is an international agreement that ought to be
performed in good faith. As Alexander Hamilton explained in the
Federalist Papers Number 75, the power making treaties does not
relate to the execution of laws, or to the creation of new ones, instead
“[i]ts objects are CONTRACTS with foreign nations, which have
the force of law, but derive it from the obligations of good faith.”127
Such an analogy reflects the idea that international treaties must be
performed in good faith.
The principle of good faith is an accepted principle of international law under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(“VCLT”), which states that “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon
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the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”128
States may not invoke the internal law provisions as a justification
for failure to comply with the United States’ obligations under international law because states are bound to interpret treaties “in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.”129 This principle is binding upon the United States as customary international law and a general principle of international law
recognized by nations throughout the world.130
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”131 The Court, however, noted that “where there is no
treaty, . . . resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations.”132 Therefore, to fulfill its treaty obligations in good faith
in compliance with the terms of the VCLT, U.S. courts must enforce
international arbitration agreements, even in insurance contracts,
which are traditionally governed by states’ laws.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Conclusions
Consistent case law in the Eleventh Circuit demonstrates a
strong likelihood that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals would
refuse to apply the reverse-preemption provision in the MFA to invalidate an agreement to arbitrate under the Convention.
Congress did not intend that a treaty, like the Convention, would
be within the scope of the reverse-preemption provision in the MFA.
The term “Act of Congress” in the MFA referred strictly to legisla-
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tive activity because the legislative history of the MFA does not indicate that Congress intended to reverse-preempt an implemented
treaty whether self-executing or not.
B. Recommendations
This Article recommends that Congress amend the MFA to define the term “Act of Congress” as limited to the legislative activities
under Article I of the United States Constitution.
Congress should amend the MFA to state that anti-arbitration
provisions are valid only in domestic cases so as not to interfere with
international obligations under the Convention. Moreover, Congress
should amend the MFA to, or enact other legislation that would,
state that enforcement of arbitration agreements should be enforceable in the business of insurance.

